In this excellent paper, Haspelmath highlights the importance of understanding the mechanism that links, on the one hand, functional pressures on language use, and on the other, patterns of grammaticality within and across languages. The author argues that there is a close mapping between these two disparate aspects of language and demonstrates this within the framework of Optimality Theory. This is particularly interesting since OT might be considered to be a typical generative theory of language. As such, there is no theory-internal reason to expect OT constraints to map well onto pressures from language use. Haspelmath argues convincingly, however, not only that OT constraints do indeed match functional pressures, but even that OT theorists actually justify particular constraints with reference to function.
seems reasonable to assume, as Haspelmath argues, that user optimality affects the selection of linguistic variants over time in this way and thus leads inevitably to the adaptive fit of I-laguage grammars to the pressures of performance acting on Ε-language utterances.
But there is something wrong with this picture. User optimality constraints work by affecting the relative frequency of use of different variants (either in production, through speaker choice, or possibly during acquisition through filtering by the parser). Adaptation occurs when these relative frequencies become entrenched as fixed grammatical patterns. In general, however, this will only be possible where there is a way for grammars to express the relevant patterns. We have no reason to suppose that this will always be the case. In other words, why should we assume that the domain of I-language is a blank slate onto which any useful constraints can be written? For example, consider dative shift in English:
(1) I gave N f ACC [a copy of our latest CD] to ΝΡολτ [the man].
(2) I gave w» D/tT [the man] NFacc [a copy of our latest CD].
Hawkins's (1994) processing theory suggests that variants such as 2 are easier to parse than 1 whenever there are fewer words in NP Di4r than NP^cc-We do not expect, however, that this preference will end up being coded in grammars as a constraint that a construction like 2 is only grammatical when length of NP Dj4r is lower than NP^Cc· F°r example, the sentence 3 is certainly grammatical. This is because grammars do not encode constraints that explicitly count numbers of words. Instead grammatical constraints typically seem to refer to formal types of construction rather than quantitative properties of those constructions. Of course, if we were to find that, for some reason NP Dy4r s were typically shorter than NP^c c s then we might expect that constructions like 2 might become the only option for expressing the dative in English. It is this sort of "recoding" in grammatical terms of functional pressures that we should be on the look-out for when assessing the effect of diachronic adaptation. To be fair, Haspelmath himself is clearly aware of this problem. As he says, "there are universal properties of language that probably cannot be derived from constraints on language use, e. g. the fact that grammars generally do not contain numerical specification", but believes these "have little to do with the grammarian's everyday work". It may be that these I-language constraints on possible constraints have relatively little impact as the author suggests, but I feel we cannot know how pervasive they are at this stage. For instance, Kirby (1999) gives an example where grammatical patterns of relativisation seem only partially to match up with observed processing pressures. Whilst this might seem initially to be evidence against an adaptive account, a closer look at the way in which grammars can encode relativisation constraints reveals that not all the preferred processing constraints can properly be expressed in I-language. Similarly, the dysfunctional examples from Lightfoot (1999) that Haspelmath criticizes in the paper again appear to be related to the ways grammars can express constraints on movement. Haspelmath calls these incidental effects, but surely in so doing he is impicitly suggesting that grammars must be constrained a priori (i. e. innately 1 ) to take a form that forces these particular incidental effects and not others.
A complete theory of diachronic adaptation therefore needs to take into account both the selection pressures on linguistic variants that arise from Ε-language and the structure of I-language into which these variants must be coded. Perhaps linguistics is in a similar stage now to biology before the neo-Darwinian synthesis; before the bringing together in the mid 20th century of an understanding of the genetic representation of phenotypes (analogous to grammars) and the selection pressures that operated on those phenotypes (analogous to utterances). The puzzle is how to tease apart the effects of functional pressures and the innate constraints on adaptation in a truly explanatory theory of grammatical variation. Haspelmath mentions Newmeyer's (1991) paper on the evolution of functional innate constraints. If the constraints on I-language themselves had evolved biologically to improve our ancestors ability to communicate (if you'll pardon the teleological shorthand), then this makes things even more difficult. How can we tell if a grammatical constraint evolved diachronically or phylogeneticaly?
Haspelmath's answer is methodological. Diachronic explanations are more proximate in time and are therefore subject to easier empirical testing than biological ones. However, another approach may also be available. Evolutionary modelling (e.g. Kirby and Hurford, 1997; Briscoe, to appear and papers in Briscoe in press) allows us to accurately test the effects various communicative pressures might have had on the evolution of innate constraints. From this modelling effort it is not actually at all clear that the kind of adaptation that 1 It is worth pointing out that stating that there must be innate constraints on the forms grammars can take does not necessarily mean that these constraints must be domain specific or modular; these aspects of the generative approach to language must be assessed separately of claims of innateness.
2 We must, however, be careful of analogies such as these. As Haspelmath points out, diachronic adaptation is a different kind of mechanism from evolution by natural selection (he claims it has closer parallels with Lamarckian evolution). One of the reasons for this is that whereas grammars have to be reconstructed every generation through learning or acquisition, DNA sequences do not (they are physically passed on and copied).
Newmeyer envisages (i. e. a direct adaptation of the language acquisition device to the needs of speakers) could have been possible. Instead, the suggestion from this woik is that an evolutionary mechanism known as genetic assimilation (or sometimes, the Baldwin Effect) must be implicated. In this view, prior diachronic adaptation affects a subsequent shift in the evolutionary trajectory of the innate constraints on language acquisition. Modelling of this kind is in its infancy, and the plausibility of genetic assimilation in human evolution is a controversial topic in biology. However, the results suggest that diachronic adaptation could have had a role in determining constraints even if some are now innate.
Ultimately, Haspelmath's work is exactly the kind that linguistics needs in order to tackle these questions. A fully worked-out theory of diachronic adaptation will form the cornerstone of an explanatory linguistics, but it should be embedded within a theory of the a priori possible states of the objects that are adapting -grammars.
